Competition law aims at promoting the competitive process by preventing anti-competitive practices, while IP law provides exclusive rights to authors and inventors. Although tensions between the two fields of law exist, they share the common goal of improving incentives for innovation. It is a difficult task for competition policymakers to determine the relationship between competition and exclusivity. In practice, the most important challenge concerns restrictions on competition in licensing agreements. This article aims to examine the existing approaches at the intersection of competition law and IP from a comparative perspective, focussing on the situation in the US, the EU and Korea. While differences exist, for example, as regards the abuse of market dominance, considerable convergence can be seen in the competition law treatment of licensing agreements. This development is welcome, because harmonisation in this field is particularly conducive to the international transfer of technology.
INTRODUCTION
Competition law aims at safeguarding the competitive process in the market by preventing anticompetitive agreements and the abuse of market dominance, as well as by controlling mergers 1 , 1 In the United States, the term antitrust law is used to indicate the body of law prohibiting anti-competitive practices. Outside of the United States, competition law is more commonly used in many jurisdictions. In this article, we will continue to use competition law, except when referring to US law. 2 Carrier 2009, p. 19. 3 Cf. Hovenkamp 2011, p. 260. 4 For the EU, see European Court of Justice, Joint Cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P, RTE and ITP v. Commission ('Magill') , ECR 1995, I-743, para. 46 : "So far as a dominant position is concerned, it is to be remembered at the outset that mere ownership of an intellectual property right cannot confer such a position." For US law, see the US Supreme Court, Illinois Tool Works v. Independent Ink, 547 U.S. 28 (2006) , reversing the presumption resulting from older case-law that a patent confers market power. See also the US Licensing Guidelines, at 2.2. 5 See the ground-breaking study of Bowman 1973; for a more recent analysis, see Landes and Posner 2003, p. 374 . However, there are some criticisms of this property view. See e.g., Gilbert 2008, p. 524 et seq. 6 For an overview on the changing concepts in the relationship between IP and competition law, see Abbott 2014. Teece 2011, p. 221. 19 Sometimes, US antitrust law is given credit as the first competition law of the modern world. In fact, Canada adopted a competition law in 1889 (i.e. one year earlier than the Sherman Act in the US), although this law never achieved a status comparable to the Sherman Act, see Gerber 2010 , p. 259. 20 Wilson 1970 Carrier 2009, p. 77. 21 See e.g., ABA 2007, p. 77; Gavil et al. 2008 , p. 1195 tying of unpatented to patented products, (ii) mandatory grantbacks, (iii) post-sale resale restrictions, (iv) tie-outs (restricting a licensee's ability to deal in products outside the scope of the patent), (v) exclusive licensing, (vi) mandatory package licensing, (vii) compulsory payment of royalties not reasonably related to sales of the patented product, (viii) restrictions on sales of unpatented products made by a patented process, and (ix) utilising vertical price-fixing involving the licensing of patented products. Anderman 2008, p. 110 . The legal framework of the TTBER demonstrates newly developed features: (i) a more economic goal to EU competition policy, (ii) the use of economic analysis, (iii) the offer of safe harbour based legal certainty, and (iv) the procedural change in enforcement. See also Anderman and Schmidt 2011, pp. 203-204. the older text. 40 There were major developments in the TTBERs, which were the abandonment of white lists and the considerable shortening of black lists. 41 This development was apparently inspired by the repeal of the Nine No-No's in the US and the adoption of market share thresholds subject to exceptions for hard-core restrictions.
The development of the different block exemption regulations is characterised by the transition from a rather 'formalist and rigid' approach creating strait-jacket problems to a generally positive view of licensing, because it facilitates the distribution of knowledge and skills and maximises the beneficial outcomes of innovation through licensing and technology exchange. 42 The automatic exemption of certain technology transfer agreements thus reduces the private and public administrative costs and burdens of a case-by-case scrutiny under Article 101 (1) and (3) IPR and does not go against the original purpose of the right in question. At the same time, the Guidelines provide certain criteria for the scrutiny of whether an exercise of IP rights runs afoul of the prohibition of the abuse of market dominance and of restrictive agreements. Therefore, the Guidelines cover both unilateral and coordinated practices which are somewhat different from those of other competition regimes.
In particular, the Korean IP Guidelines provide the criteria for the relevant market definition by stating that other KFTC guidelines on the abuse of market dominance and merger control can also be applicable mutatis mutandis. In addition, similar to those of other regimes, they state that technology markets and innovation markets have to be distinguished. The Guidelines also prescribe specific criteria for the scrutiny of a number of practices, including the acquisition of patent rights, grantbacks, the exercise of patent rights by filing suits, grant of licence, refusal to license, patent pools, technology standards, the exercise of patent rights by non-practicing entities, and so on. No's in the US and the pre-1996 regulations in the EU. Despite the lack of binding effect, the
Guidelines are important as screening devices for allocating the enforcement agency's resources and for informing a category of acts that possibly violate the law. 54 In addition to the Guidelines, the Korean competition regime provides a 'comfort letter' type authorisation method for agreements, which can reduce possible over-enforcement.
Unlike the safe harbour provisions in the guidelines of the US and the EU, the Korean IP Guidelines do not provide market share thresholds. One of the main reasons is that the MRFTA already provides a market dominance presumption standard which is based on market shares.
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In addition, the KFTC's other guidelines, including those on unfair business practices and agreements, contain the safety zone criteria of market share thresholds, which are 10 and 20
52 See also Choi 2011, p. 126. 53 The Supreme Court of Korea held that the market share threshold in the Guidelines is not legally binding, and the Commission can withdraw the relevant provision in individual cases, e.g., Supreme Court of Korea, Judgment 2009Du9543, 25 November 2010 See e.g., Ginsburg and Fraser 2011, p. 49. 55 Art. 4 MRFTA: Market share of a single undertaking is 50% or more; alternatively, the combined market share of three or fewer undertakings is 75% or more (with an exception for firms with a market share below 10%).
per cent respectively. 56 Therefore, it is possible that undertakings may rely on the criteria of market-share-based standards, although the Korean IP Guidelines do not include a marketshare-threshold exemption.
THE STANDARD OF DESIGNING GUIDELINES: TRANSPLANTATION OF LEGAL TECHNIQUES

The Necessity of Rules for the Grey Area
Competition law and IP law face certain conflicts in implementation and often work as a spear and a shield in courtrooms because of the intrinsic tensions between them, at least in the short run. 57 Therefore, as discussed above, the issue of the intersection between competition law and IP is one of the most difficult and heavily debated areas of the law. 58 In particular, the debate about the ex ante and ex post approaches is at the heart of competition policy in the field of IP.
In theory, holding a monopoly position, possibly for a short term, can provide investment incentives for inventions, thereby generating worthier long-run social gains. 59 Therefore, the ex ante approach, which is based on incentives, contrasts with the ex post approach by placing less emphasis on market power and is crucial for the competition law scrutiny of IP cases.
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Considering both the ex ante and ex post approaches, it is important for policymakers to decide whether IP and competition law intrinsically conflict with each other or simply have different methods to achieve the same objective. 61 But also, if the latter view is taken (which we here advise), it is important to provide clearer guidance for the exercise of IP rights, especially through the adoption of IP guidelines as shown previously.
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In this context, the concept of market power seems particularly important. In fact, the market share thresholds which numerous competition regimes have adopted also appear appropriate in the IP context, although there are some ongoing debates about which type of market structure is the most conducive to innovation. 64 The number of cases involving the interface of IP and competition law is increasing worldwide, including in the developing world. 65 A convergence in the regulatory frameworks of IP guidelines will help multinational enterprises to avoid possible violations of competition law in other jurisdictions. Nevertheless, the concept of market power itself is often regarded as a difficult one, and a conventional price test for assessing market power often fails, especially in the IP world. 66 Therefore, it is crucial to give direction for the definition of markets and the assessment of market power in IP-related contexts.
Market Definition and Market Power in the New Economy
Because most competition regimes rely on market share thresholds to assess potential anticompetitive harm, market definition is essential. 67 However, as Kaplow asserts, it is often difficult to rationalise market definition in a coherent and useful way. 68 Indeed, a substitution analysis for the purpose of market definition is becoming more difficult in the ICT sector because empirical data for cross-elasticity is unreliable or even unavailable, thus making it difficult to apply the SSNIP test (small but significant and non-transitory increase in price).
Moreover, this test is rather useful for a static market analysis, focusing on short-term price use. The SSNIP test may be useful in this context, i.e. the response of licensees to a small but permanent increase in relative prices, i.e. the royalties. 78 As stated above, this set of provisions can also be found in Korea, which indicates a large degree of convergence.
There is no doubt that the US Guidelines have influenced IP guidance in other competition regimes, especially regarding the complexity of market definition and the distinction between technology and innovation markets. 79 This standard of analysis, despite the existing problem of vague criteria in technology markets, has spread out around the world and has influenced the design of IP guidelines universally. The methodology of market definition and market share thresholds, with exceptions for hard-core restrictions, demonstrates an important convergence in competition law techniques.
Moreover, it is not an easy task to determine the market share of the parties to an IP licensing arrangement, because it is difficult to define the relevant market in the new economy. 80 In particular, innovative goods can leap forward and change to another market easily, thereby replacing old ones. Therefore, we can often observe sudden and unpredictable high market shares in technology and innovation markets. Some argue that a quick look assessment based on market share falls short, because IP-related markets have a dynamic nature. Therefore, a high market share may be a poor indicator in the arena of rapid change and may insufficiently suggest market power in some cases. 81 Over-enforcement may be the consequence: If IP holders cannot satisfy the conditions of the block exemption, they may be hesitant to license out their technology. A disincentive to license would be the consequence. 
Flexibilities and Solutions
These concerns deserve further analysis. Before looking deeper into the problem of market definition and the weight of market shares in the IP context, a more general discussion seems Anderman 2008, pp. 117-118. lists in the early block exemption regulations in the EU was criticised because of the lack of economic underpinning and the straight-jacket effect. A more positive appreciation of restrictive clauses in licensing agreements was called for. At the same time, market share thresholds were rejected, because -in the view of the critics -it is difficult for firms to determine their market share. However, this position does not seem consistent. If a more economic perspective is taken, going beyond the type of the licensing clause and taking into account the whole economic context, the position of firms in the market is a decisive factor.
For example, in the assessment of an exclusive licence, it is important to know if the parties are competitors or if they stand in a vertical relationship to each other. In both cases, the strength of the parties in the affected markets is likewise important.
As market shares are the most helpful proxy in gaining a first impression of market power, it seems indispensable to accompany the more lenient treatment of restrictive licensing clauses with the caveat of market share thresholds. To be clear in this regard: Market share thresholds
should not determine the outcome of the analysis. They should rather work as a safe harbour:
Below the threshold, firms can be sure that their licensing agreement is compatible with competition law (as long as hardcore restrictions are avoided). Above the threshold, a more careful analysis is necessary. The result of the deeper evaluation may still be in favour of the agreement as it stands. However, a closer look is required to get to this result. To summarise, it is not possible to call for a more economic view, and at the same time, to reject instruments of analysis whose aim is precisely to draw closer to the economic reality of markets.
This leads to the difficulties inherent in market share criteria. It is certainly one of the most demanding exercises of competition law to define relevant markets. However, on the one hand, market definition does not start from scratch. As it is at the heart of competition law, a plethora of case law, nationally and internationally, is available in order to help with this task. As has been pointed out, guidelines apply the framework to IP-related contexts. On the other hand, additional instruments have been introduced which short-circuit the need for market definition. There is space for the justification of restrictive agreements as long as the necessity of the restriction for the process of innovation is shown. However, the innovation argument must not serve as a mere pretext hiding the anticompetitive goal of certain restrictions.
CONCLUSIONS
In the globalised world, competitiveness and innovation play a crucial role in economic growth. 85 The emergence and development of the new economy is driven by innovation, and innovation often takes the form of IP. 86 Therefore, cases involving the interface of IP and competition law are arising more and more frequently. At the same time, technological complexity has increased the need for interaction among competitors, which raises competition law issues. 87 The importance of dynamic competition, rather than static competition, has to be emphasised, and this on a global basis. 88 Against this backdrop, a number of competition law regimes have provided guidance through the issuance of IP guidelines. Indeed, proper guidance 84 All this is explained in more depth in the European TT-Guidelines, N. 79 et seq. 85 Bohannan and Hovenkamp 2012, p. 1; Carrier 2009, p. 1. 86 Gavil et al. 2008 Gavil et al. , p. 1153 See e.g., Sullivan and Grimes 2006, p. 841. 88 Teece 2011, p. 208. is essential, especially when competition law evolves through statutory provisions rather than case law.
While there is some divergence in monopoly cases among competition regimes, 89 we can observe a considerable convergence in the IP licensing framework. Some general principles seem to be widely accepted today, including the following: (i) for the purpose of competition law, IP is comparable to other forms of property; (ii) IPRs in themselves do not automatically create market power; and (iii) IP licensing is generally favourable to competition. 90 In addition, this general framework is implemented by specific rules based on the distinction of product, technology, and innovation markets, the difference between horizontal and vertical agreements, market share thresholds, exceptions for hardcore restrictions, as well as other safe harbours and presumptions (e.g., the 4-plus-test).
There are inevitable trade-offs between IP and competition law, 91 but there is no genuine contradiction between these two fields of law. It may be true that 'perfect competition is incompatible with IP', 92 but this adage is restricted to the world of static equilibrium theory. In the "real world", the positive and negative aspects of exclusivity have to be explored with the aim of providing the optimal incentives to innovate. 93 IP guidelines have to strike the balance between the under-enforcement and over-enforcement of competition law. On the one hand, IP guidelines provide a green light to agreements which are favourable for competition and innovation; on the other hand, they provide yellow and red lights to undertakings that are reaching the level of anti-competitive concern.
Today, competition regimes around the world admit the benefits of various types of efficiency-enhancing co-operation between undertakings and specify such business practices in their guidelines. 94 Regularly, undertakings are under a duty of self-assessment. In particular, multinational enterprises have improved their efforts to comply with competition laws in the major competition jurisdictions. 95 The adoption of guidelines has facilitated this endeavour.
